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“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.”1
I.  INTRODUCTION
A very difficult issue facing the United States is applying First
Amendment rights in cyberspace. With the motive of protecting children,
the government has attempted regulation in this area concerning virtual
child pornography and minors accessing pornographic materials online.
Finding that “the use of children in the production of sexually explicit
material, including photographs, films, videos, computer images, and other
visual depictions, is a form of sexual abuse which can result in physical or
* Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University; J.D., University of Toledo
College of Law, Order of the Coif; M.A. and B.A., Bowling Green State University.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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psychological harm, or both, to the children involved,”2 Congress passed
the Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 (“CPPA”).3 The CPPA
expanded the federal ban on child pornography from pornographic images
made using actual children to include computer-generated images
appearing to be children engaged in sexually explicit conduct.4 On April
16, 2002, in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the U.S. Supreme Court
struck down sections of the CPPA as overbroad and unconstitutional.5
Finding that minors have access to harmful materials through the
widespread availability of the Internet,6 Congress in 1998 enacted the Child
Online Protection Act (“COPA”)7 to restrict access by minors to harmful
materials sold on the World Wide Web. This section was carefully drafted8
to respond to a 1997 U.S. Supreme Court decision, Reno v. American Civil
Liberties Union
 (“ACLU”),9 that struck down as unconstitutional
provisions of the Communications Decency Act (“CDA”),10 which was
enacted by Congress in 1996 to limit the exposure of children to sexually
explicit materials online. On May 13, 2002, in Ashcroft v. ACLU, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld sections of COPA as not unconstitutionally
overbroad, but the Court expressed no view as to whether other provisions
are overbroad, whether the statute is vague, or whether COPA survives
strict scrutiny.11
Both the CPPA and the COPA were statutes intended by Congress to
protect minors. The CPPA was intended to protect minors from the harmful
effects of virtual child pornography. The COPA was intended to protect
2. S. REP. NO. 104-358, at 2 (1996). Congress further found that where children are
used in the production of child pornography, it could hurt the children involved in future
years. Further, child pornography is often used to seduce other children into sexual activity.
Visual depictions of children engaged in sexual activities stimulate a pedophile, and the
danger to children who are seduced is just as great whether visual depictions involving an
actual child or computer-generated images are used. Thus, there is a compelling
governmental interest for prohibiting both actual photography of children engaged in
sexually explicit conduct as well as computer-generated images which are virtually
indistinguishable. Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000).
4. Id.
5. 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002). See infra notes 48-66 and accompanying text.
6. H.R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 2 (1998). Congress found that while custody, care, and
nurture of children first resides with parents, such availability frustrates parental control.
Further, until that time, there had been no national solution to the problem of minors
accessing harmful materials on the World Wide Web. Id.
7. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (2000).
8. H. R. REP. NO. 105-775, at 5.
9. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
10. Communications Decency Act, title V, § 502, 110 Stat. 133 (1996) (current version
at 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2000)).
11. 122 S. Ct. 1700 (2002). See infra notes 90-99 and accompanying text.
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minors from pornography currently available commercially on the World
Wide Web. Neither statute currently is being enforced, despite their
laudable motives to protect children. This Article will examine both
statutes and both U.S. Supreme Court decisions. It also will predict the
future of COPA and will recommend further congressional action to protect
minors from the harmful effects of both virtual and real child pornography,
and from accessing pornography on the Web.
II.  CPPA AND ASHCROFT V. FREE SPEECH COALITION
Congress has repeatedly enacted legislation banning sexual
exploitation of children. Finding that child pornography was both highly
organized and profitable, and exploited children,12 Congress in 1977 passed
the Protecting of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act.13 This Act
criminalized knowingly using a minor younger than age sixteen to engage
in sexually explicit conduct to produce a visual depiction.14 In 1984,
Congress passed the Child Protection Act,15 which expanded the 1977 Act
and did away with the previous Act’s requirement that the prohibited
material be considered obscene under Miller v. California.16 The 1984 Act
also raised the minor’s age from sixteen to eighteen and included not-for-
profit trafficking.17 This law was again amended in 1986 by the Child
Sexual Abuse and Pornography Act, which banned the production and use
of advertisements for child pornography and created civil liability for
personal injuries to children from the production of child pornography.18
The Child Protection and Obscenity Enforcement Act of 1988 made it
unlawful to use a computer to transport, distribute, or receive child
pornography.19 The Child Protection Restoration and Penalties
Enhancement Act of 1990 prohibits the knowing possession of visual
depictions of a minor in sexually explicit conduct.20 In 1994, Congress
again amended federal law concerning child pornography to allow
12. S. REP. NO. 95-438 at 5 (1977).
13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2000).
14. Sections 2251-52 have withstood constitutional challenges. United States v. Reedy,
845 F.2d 239 (10th Cir. 1988). Only one person, however, was convicted under the Act’s
prohibition on using children to produce a visual depiction. 1986 ATT’Y GEN. COMM’N ON
PORNOGRAPHY FINAL REP. 604.
15. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2251-2253 (2000).
16. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
17. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(1). See Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. §
2256 (2000).
18. Id. §§ 2251, 2255.
19. Id. § 2252.
20. Id. § 2251.
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restitution to victims.21 All of the above federal legislation criminalized the
use of actual children in the production of child pornography.
Changes in technology often leave the legal system struggling to keep
up. In 1996, Congress passed the CPPA to ban computer-generated images
of child pornography.22 The CPPA bans sexually explicit depictions,
including any photograph, film, video or computer-generated image or
picture, that appear to be minors,23 and visual depictions that are
“advertised, promoted, presented, described, or distributed in such a
manner that conveys the impression” that they contain sexually explicit
depictions of minors.24 “Sexually explicit” is defined as “actual or
simulated sexual intercourse, . . . bestiality, masturbation, sadistic or
masochistic abuse, or lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area.”25
There is an affirmative defense if an actual adult was used in production,
and the material was not promoted, described, or distributed in such a way
as to give the impression that it contained a visual depiction of a minor
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.26
The CPPA’s constitutionality was immediately challenged by
plaintiffs including the Free Speech Coalition, which is a trade association
that defends First Amendment rights against censorship, the publisher of a
book dedicated to the education and expression of nudism, and individual
artists whose works include nude and erotic photographs and paintings.
Finding that the plaintiffs had standing, the district court in Free Speech
Coalition v. Reno
 found that the CPPA was not an improper prior restraint
of speech because it is content neutral and clearly advances important and
compelling governmental interests.27 The court further held that the CPPA
is not overbroad, because it specifies only materials that do not use adults,
and is not unconstitutionally vague, as it clearly and specifically defines the
prohibited conduct and gives sufficient guidance to a person of reasonable
21. Id. § 2259.
22. Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000). Other
countries have attempted to lead with this issue as well. Great Britain amended its
Protection of Children Act to cover pseudo-photographs created by a computer and Canada
has banned visual representations that show a person under eighteen depicted as engaged in
sexual activity. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61, 65 n.1 (1st Cir. 1999) (citing Criminal
Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, c. 33 (Eng.); R.S.C ch. C-46, § 163.1(1)(a)(i)(1998)
(Can.)).
23. 18 U.S.C. § 2256.
24. Id. § 2256(8)(D).
25. Id. § 2256(2).
26. Id. § 2252A(c).
27. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 25 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 2305, 2307, 2310 (1998).
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intelligence as to what it prohibits.28 The government was granted summary
judgment.29
In 1999, a majority of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
while reversing the district court’s ruling on the Act itself, affirmed the
parties’ standing to challenge the constitutionality of the CPPA’s language
“appears to be [a minor]” and “conveys the impression.”30 Reviewing the
constitutionality of the statute itself de novo, the Ninth Circuit ruled that
the First Amendment prohibits Congress from enacting a statute that
criminalizes the generation of images of children engaged in explicit sexual
conduct, and that the district court erred in finding a compelling state
interest served by the statute, because actual children were not involved.31
The appeals court held that the language “appears to be [a minor]”32 and
“conveys the impression,” as found in the CPPA,33 are unconstitutionally
vague and overbroad.34
The Ninth Circuit dissent in Free Speech Coalition v. Reno would
have found the CPPA constitutional.35 The dissent stated that the majority
improperly suggested that preventing harm to depicted children is the only
legitimate justification for banning child pornography.36 The U.S. Supreme
Court endorsed other justifications relied on by Congress when it passed
the CPPA.37 According to the dissent, new justifications could be relied
upon, as long as they advance the goal of protecting children.38 The dissent
also disagreed that the CPPA is unconstitutionally vague, as key phrases
are defined.39
28. Id. at 2309-10.
29. Id. at 2310.
30. Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
31. Id. at 1086, 1092. The court stated that factual studies that would show a link
between computer-generated child pornography and the subsequent sexual abuse of children
apparently do not yet exist. Id. at 1093.
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B) (2000).
33. Id. § 2256(8)(D).
34. Free Speech Coalition, 198 F.3d at 1097.
35. Id. at 1098.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1099 (citing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 110-11 (1990)).
38. Id. Further, the dissent notes that the majority ignores the fact that child
pornography has little or no social value, and that virtual child pornography should be
treated no differently, as it is not valued speech. Id. at 1100.
39. Id. at 1103.
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The First,40 Eleventh,41 Fourth,42 and Fifth43 Circuit Courts agreed with
the dissent in the Ninth Circuit. In 1999, before the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, the First Circuit in United States v. Hilton held that the CPPA
survives constitutional challenge as it is neither vague, nor a substantial
infringement on protected expression.44 After the Ninth Circuit’s decision,
the Eleventh Circuit upheld a conviction under the CPPA, affirming a
district court’s decision that the statute is constitutional.45 In 2000, the
Fourth Circuit also concluded that the CPPA passed constitutional muster,
affirming a district court’s decision.46 In 2001, the Fifth Circuit confirmed a
defendant’s sentence and conviction, finding that virtual child
pornography, like “real” child pornography, is not entitled to First
Amendment protection, and that the CPPA is not overbroad.47
40. United States v. Hilton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
41. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999).
42. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000).
43. United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001).
44. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 65. In 1997, a federal grand jury indicted defendant Hilton for
criminal possession of computer disks containing three or more images of child
pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). The district court granted the
defendant’s motion to dismiss the indictment, finding the language “appears to be a minor”
was overbroad and vague. United States v. Hilton, 999 F. Supp. 131, 137 (D. Me. 1998). On
appeal, the First Circuit reversed, finding no reason to strike down the CPPA as
unconstitutionally vague. Hilton, 167 F.3d at 76.
45. Acheson, 195 F.3d at 648. The defendant pled guilty to knowingly receiving visual
depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct that had been transported in
interstate commerce. More than 500 images of child pornography were found on his
computer. Id. The Eleventh Circuit found the CPPA was neither overbroad nor
impermissibly vague. Id. at 652.
46. Mento, 231 F.3d at 915. The defendant pled guilty to possessing child pornography
after a search of his computer, external drives, and disks yielded more than 100 images of
naked prepubescent children in sexually explicit situations, including being engaged in overt
sexual acts with adults and other children. One image, according to the caption, involved a
five-year-old. Id. While stating that “the First Amendment is the bedrock upon which our
political system is founded,” the court noted that “Congress may regulate protected speech
to promote a compelling governmental interest.” Id. at 918, 920. Since Congress found that
pornography involving those who appear to be minors has the same effects on child
molesters as pornography involving actual minors, the government’s interest in banning this
material is equally as compelling. Id. at 921. Finding the CPPA to be “bold and innovative
in its attempt to combat the sexual exploitation of minors,” the Fourth Circuit held the
CPPA does not offend the First Amendment. Id. at 923.
47. Fox, 248 F.3d at 404. The defendant was indicted for knowingly receiving child
pornography, as defined under 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8). The defendant’s motion to dismiss was
denied, and a jury convicted him. Fox, 248 F.3d at 398. The defendant appealed both the
conviction and the sentence, which were both affirmed by the Fifth Circuit. Id. at 411. The
Fifth Circuit joined the First, Fourth, and Eleventh Circuits, and respectfully disagreed with
the Ninth Circuit. Id. at 401, 403.
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On April 16, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court in Ashcroft v. Free
Speech Coalition
 agreed with the Ninth Circuit’s majority opinion.48 In an
opinion authored by Justice Kennedy, and joined by Justices Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, the majority of the Court found the
provisions “appears to be [a minor]” and “conveys the impression [it
depicts a minor]” were overbroad and unconstitutional.49
In 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court in Miller v. California set the
standard for material that may be banned as obscene.50 In 1982, the Court in
New York v. Ferber
 held that pornography involving minors may be
prohibited regardless of whether the images are obscene under the Miller
test due to the compelling governmental interest in protecting against the
sexual exploitation of children.51 The Court in Free Speech Coalition
addressed the CPPA’s constitutionality where it prohibits speech that may
not rise to the definition of obscene under Miller, nor technically be child
pornography under Ferber, because live children are not used in the
production process.52 While recognizing that free speech has limits and
certain categories of speech are not protected, including defamation,
incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children, the
Court did not expand these categories to include virtual child
pornography.53
Justice Kennedy observed that sexual abuse of a child is a most
serious crime,54 but Congress has passed laws to protect children from
abuse.55 Speaking from the position of a daughter who lost her father due to
48. 122 S. Ct. 1389 (2002).
49. Id. at 1405-06. The Court did not address whether the provisions found in 18 U.S.C.
§ 2256(8)(B) and (D) were also overbroad. Id. 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(C), involving computer
morphing, was also not challenged and so was not considered by the Court. Id. at 1397.
50. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). The three-prong Miller test asks:
(a) Whether ‘the average person, applying contemporary community standards’
would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct
specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Id. at 24 (citations omitted).
51. 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
52. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1397.
53. Id. at 1399.
54. Id.
55. See 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2000). That states in pertinent part:
Whoever crosses a State line with intent to engage in a sexual act with a person
who has not attained the age of 12 years, or in the special maritime and territorial
jurisdiction of the United States or in a Federal prison, knowingly engages in a
sexual act with another person who has not attained the age of 12 years, or
knowingly engages in a sexual act under the circumstances described in
subsections (a) and (b) with another person who has attained the age of 12 years
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a crime, this Author observes that there is little comfort in prosecuting the
wrongdoers after the fact; prevention is a much better option. The CPPA
attempted to prevent crimes perpetrated against children by restricting
access to materials that could incite such crimes. Justice Kennedy further
observed that the CPPA’s penalties are severe.56 Countless literary works
such as Shakespeare’s Romeo and Juliet, and movies, such as Traffic and
American Beauty, involve scenes of teenage sexuality. Justice Kennedy
also stated that if virtual child pornography images were identical to
pornography using real children, the latter would be driven from the market
by the indistinguishable substitutes, as few pornographers would risk
prosecution by abusing real children.57
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, but found the
government’s prosecution rationale persuasive.58 Instead of stating that
pornographers would flock to virtual child pornography, Justice Thomas
asserted that persons who possess and disseminate images of real children
could avoid prosecution by claiming that the images are nearly
indistinguishable from virtual child pornography.59 Justice Thomas also
observed that a more complete affirmative defense would be one way to
save the statute’s constitutionality.60
Justice O’Connor concurred with the judgment in part and dissented
in part.61 She agreed that the CPPA’s ban on youthful-adult pornography
appeared to violate the First Amendment.62 Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Scalia joined Justice O’Connor’s dissent in finding the CPPA’s
but has not attained the age of 16 years (and is at least 4 years younger than the
person so engaging), or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title,
imprisoned for any term of years or life, or both. If the defendant has previously
been convicted of another Federal offense under this subsection, or of a State
offense that would have been an offense under either such provision had the
offense occurred in a Federal prison, unless the death penalty is imposed, the
defendant shall be sentenced to life in prison.
Id.
 To the extent that this statute deters crime, the Court is correct in stating that this act
protects children.
56. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1398. While a first offender may be imprisoned
for up to fifteen years, and a repeat offender faces five to thirty years (18 U.S.C. §
2252A(b)(1)) this is not relevant to the overbreadth of the language found by the Court in
subsections B and D of the CPPA.
57. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. at 1404, 1406.
58. Id. at 1406.
59. Id. Justice Thomas noted that the government has no case where the defendant has
been acquitted on this defense. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1407.
62. Id. at 1410. Justice O’Connor agrees with the majority that this portion of the statute
is overbroad, and that the CPPA’s “conveys the impression” language should be struck
down. Id. at 1407.
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prohibition of virtual child pornography overbroad.63 Justice O’Connor
would take a narrower approach than the majority and strike the “appears
to be” provision only as it applies to youthful-adult pornography.64
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, dissenting, would uphold
the CPPA in its entirety and they find a compelling interest in doing so.65
Chief Justice Rehnquist would be loath to construe a statute as banning
film portrayals of Shakespeare. In fact, Congress explicitly instructed that
such a reading of the CPPA is unwarranted.66
Thus, the U.S. Supreme Court has struck down provisions of the
CPPA as unconstitutionally overbroad. Currently, virtual child
pornography is not banned, although child pornography that is created
using real children is.
III.  COPA AND ASHCROFT V. AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION
The CDA,67 a part of the 1996 Telecommunications Act,68 was
Congress’s first attempt to limit the exposure of children to sexually
explicit materials online.69
The CDA as enacted stated that anyone who, “by means of a
telecommunications device[,] knowingly makes, creates, or solicits, and
initiates the transmission of, any comment, request, suggestion, proposal,
image, or other communication which is obscene . . . or indecent,” knowing
that the recipient of the communication is younger than the age of eighteen,
is subject to criminal penalties of imprisonment of no more than two years,
or a fine, or both.70 Subsection (d) of the CDA criminalized knowingly
using an interactive computer service to send, or display in a manner
available to others, any image or “communication that, in context, depicts
or describes, in terms patently offensive as measured by contemporary
community standards, sexual or excretory activity or organs.”71
The CDA provided three safe harbors: There was no violation for
access or connection of providers who also do not create content; there was
63. Id. at 1408. Justice O’Connor believes that a ban on virtual child pornography
passes strict scrutiny due to a compelling governmental interest in protecting children. Id.
She further believes that such a ban is not unconstitutionally vague. Id.
64. Id. at 1410.
65. Id. at 1414.
66. Id. at 1412. Justice Scalia did not join in this portion of the dissent involving
legislative history. Id. at 1412 n.2.
67. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (Supp. V 2000).
68. 47 U.S.C. § 151 et seq. (Supp. V 2000).
69. 141 CONG. REC. 15501 (1995).
70. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. V 2000).
71. Id. § 223(d).
MOTA MAC13.DOC 12/02/02  4:37 PM
94 FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55
no violation for employers for an employee’s conduct outside the scope of
employment; there was no violation for those who made a good faith effort
to restrict access to minors or for those who have restricted access to
minors by such means as a verified credit card, debit account, adult access
code or identification number.72
When the CDA was signed into law on February 8, 1996, members of
various groups and individuals associated with the computer and/or
communications industries or those who publish or post materials on the
Internet filed suit against Attorney General Janet Reno and the U.S.
Department of Justice.73 Shortly thereafter, the American Library
Association and others filed suit, and these cases were consolidated for all
matters relating to the preliminary injunction.74 After an evidentiary
hearing, the district court granted a temporary restraining order, finding the
“indecency” provision of the CDA to be unconstitutionally vague.75
A three-judge panel was appointed pursuant to the CDA,76 and the
panel concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiffs established a
reasonable probability of eventual success in proving subsections (a) and
(d) of the CDA unconstitutional. The plaintiffs showed irreparable injury
and a preliminary injunction was granted.77
The government appealed directly to the U.S. Supreme Court. In its
June 26, 1997 decision, the Supreme Court held that the CDA’s “indecent
transmission” and “patently offensive display” provisions violated the First
Amendment’s protection of free speech,78 thus affirming the district court.
72. Id. § 223(e).
73. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824, 827 (E.D. Pa. 1996). The plaintiffs were the
American Civil Liberties Union; Human Rights Watch; Electronic Privacy Information
Center; Electronic Frontier Foundation; Journalism Education Association; Computer
Professionals for Social Responsibility; National Writers Union; Clarinet Communications
Corp.; Institute for Global Communications; Stop Prisoner Rape; AIDS Education Global
Information System; Bibliobytes; Queer Resources Directory; Critical Path AIDS Project,
Inc.; Wildcat Press, Inc.; Declan McCullagh d/b/a Justice on Campus; Brock Meeks d/b/a
Cyberwire Dispatch; John Trover d/b/a The Safer Sex Page; Jonathan Wallace d/b/a The
Ethical Spectacle; and Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc. Id.
74. Id. at 828.
75. Id. at 827.
76. 47 U.S.C. § 223 note (2000).
77. ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 879.
78. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). See Sue Ann Mota, Neither Dead nor
Forgotten: The Past, Present, and Future of the Communications Decency Act in Light of
Reno v. ACLU, COMPUTER L. REV. & TECH. J. 1 (Winter 1998).
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Congress carefully drafted a response79 to the Court’s decision in
Reno v. ACLU
 by passing the COPA, which prohibits the sale of
pornographic materials on the World Wide Web to minors.80 Unlike the
CDA, COPA applies only to material placed on the Web, covers only
communications made for commercial purposes, and restricts only material
that is harmful to minors.81 Drawing on the obscenity test developed by the
Court in Miller v. California, COPA uses contemporary community
standards.82 COPA was to go into effect on November 29, 1998, but on
October 22, 1998, plaintiffs, including the American Civil Liberties Union,
Web site operators, and content providers, filed a suit to challenge the
constitutionality of COPA and sought injunctive relief from its
enforcement.83 A temporary restraining order was issued on November 20,
1998, and after five days of testimony in January 1999, the district court
granted a preliminary injunction.84 In doing so, the district court concluded,
“This Court and many parents and grandparents would like to see the
efforts of Congress to protect children from harmful materials on the
Internet to ultimately succeed and the will of the majority of citizens in this
country to be realized through the enforcement of an act of Congress.”85
79. H.R. REP. No. 105-775, at 5 (1998). Congress found that the market for
pornography has flourished on the Internet. At the time of the hearings, there were
approximately 28,000 adult sites promoting pornography on the Internet, generating close to
$925 million in annual revenues. In addition, a national effort is under way to connect every
school and library to the Internet; 95% of all schools were estimated to have Internet access
by 2000. In 1996, estimates stated that nearly half of all material on the Web was not
suitable for children. Further, minors often stumble on this material by mistake, due to
mistyping and “copycat URLs.” Exposure to this sexually explicit material harms children.
Id.
80. See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 2000).
81. Id. § 231(a)(1).
82. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973). COPA defines material that is harmful
to minors at 47 U.S.C. § 231(e)(6). See 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp V. 2000).
83. ACLU v. Reno, 31 F. Supp. 2d 473, 476 (E.D. Pa. 1999). The plaintiffs claimed that
COPA was invalid under the First Amendment for burdening the constitutionally protected
speech of adults and minors, and was unconstitutionally vague under the First and Fifth
Amendments. Id. at 477.
84. Id. The plaintiffs proved the requirements to obtain a preliminary injunction:
(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm; (3) that less harm
will result to the defendant if the preliminary injunction issues [to the plaintiffs]
than if the preliminary injunction does not issue; and (4) that the public interest, if
any, weighs in favor of plaintiffs.
Id.
 at 481 (citing Pappan Enters. v. Hardees’s Food Sys., 143 F.3d 800, 803 (3d Cir. 1998)).
Either affirmative defense—the credit card option or the age verification system—would
impose significant burdens on Web publishers. Id. at 489-90, 495.
85. Id. at 498.
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In affirming the District Court’s injunction in 2000,86 the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals also approved the District Court’s statement that
“sometimes we must make decisions that we do not like. We make them
because they are right, right in the sense that the law and the Constitution,
as we see them, compel the result.”87
Two possible ways to limit the interpretation of COPA would be to
assign a narrow meaning to the language of the statute or delete the portion
of the statute that is unconstitutional.88 The Third Circuit, however, stated
that striking “contemporary community standards” was not likely to
salvage the statute’s constitutionality, as the standard is an integral part of
the statute.89 Thus, the preliminary injunction stands.
The U.S. Supreme Court decided one narrow question: whether
COPA’s use of “community standards” to identify material that is harmful
to minors violates the First Amendment. A divided Court ruled on May 13,
2002, that it does not.90 Justice Thomas, joined by Justices O’Connor,
Scalia, and Breyer, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, held that COPA’s reliance
on community standards does not, by itself, render the statute overbroad,
but they did not address whether COPA was overbroad for other reasons,
whether it was unconstitutionally vague, or if it would survive strict
scrutiny.91 Since the government did not ask that the injunction be lifted, it
was not.92
In a concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor agreed that even if
obscenity is defined by community standards, COPA is not overbroad. She
noted that a national standard is allowed under prior precedent.93 In her
opinion, a national standard is not only constitutional, but also reasonable.94
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Breyer also agreed that
COPA’s reliance on community standards does not render the statute
overbroad and that applying the same national standard does not violate the
86. ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000).
87. Id. at 181. Although the Third Circuit calls Congress’s attempt to protect minors
from harmful material on the Web laudable, the court holds that COPA “is more likely than
not to be found unconstitutional as overbroad on the merits.” Id.
88. Id. at 177.
89. Id. at 179.
90. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1703 (2002).
91. Id. at 1713.
92. Id. Further, even if COPA does employ a community standards test, this would still
not render the statute unconstitutionally overbroad. COPA applies to significantly less
material than did the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. V 2000). The CDA defines the
harmful-to-minors material in a manner parallel to the Miller definition of obscenity. See
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
93. Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. at 1714.
94. Id. at 1715.
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First Amendment.95 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Souter and
Ginsburg, concurred in the judgment, but stated that the Court of Appeals
should analyze the other issues before determining the constitutionality of
COPA.96
Justice Stevens dissented, stating that while COPA is a “substantial
improvement” over the CDA,97 he would affirm the decision of the Court of
Appeals.98
Pending further analysis in the Court of Appeals, the preliminary
injunction stands against COPA.99
IV.  CONCLUSION
Congress has made numerous attempts to protect minors from
accessing harmful materials online and from virtual child pornography,
including the CDA,100 the CPPA,101 and COPA.102 While some may
disagree,103 Congress should be encouraged to refine statutes that fulfill the
compelling government interest in protecting minors while still passing
constitutionality.104
Due to the deleterious effects virtual child pornography has on
children, this Author agrees with Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dissent in
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition,105 as well as the First,106 Fourth,107
Fifth,108 and Eleventh Circuit,109 and the dissent in the Ninth Circuit,110 that
the CPPA is constitutional. This Author would have extended First
Amendment exemption not only to child pornography involving actual
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1717.
97. Id. at 1723.
98. Id. at 1728.
99. Id. at 1702. The decision by the Court of Appeals was vacated, and the case was
remanded. Id.
100. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a) (Supp. V 2000).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2256 (2000).
102. 47 U.S.C. § 231 (Supp. V 2000).
103. Johanna M. Roodenburg, Son of CDA: The Constitutionality of the Child Online
Protection Act of 1998, 6 COMM. L. & POL’Y 227 (2001).
104. See supra notes 85, 87 and accompanying text.
105. See supra notes 65, 66 and accompanying text. See generally Matthew K. Wegner,
Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: Why Traditional Free Speech Doctrine Supports Anti-
Child-Pornography Regulations in Virtual Reality, 85 MINN. L. REV. 2081 (2001).
106. United States v. Hylton, 167 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 1999).
107. United States v. Mento, 231 F.3d 912 (4th Cir. 2000).
108. United States v. Fox, 248 F.3d 394 (5th Cir. 2001).
109. United States v. Acheson, 195 F.3d 645 (11th Cir. 1999).
110. See Free Speech Coalition v. Reno, 198 F.3d 1083, 1097 (9th Cir. 1999) (Ferguson,
J., dissenting); see also supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text.
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minors under the Ferber test,111 but also to virtually created child
pornography, which is nearly indistinguishable. Nonetheless, since the U.S.
Supreme Court has struck down the provision of COPA stating “appear to
be [minors]” and “convey the impression of minors” as overbroad,
Congress is encouraged to redraft this provision with language that will
pass constitutional muster under Ferber. Congress may consider striking
the “youthful-adult” provision found unconstitutional by Justice
O’Connor.112 Additionally, Congress should develop a more complete
affirmative defense, as suggested in Justice Thomas’s concurrence.113
With respect to minors accessing obscene materials on the Web, if
aspects of COPA are found unconstitutional after further scrutiny by the
Third Circuit, and the injunction against COPA is not lifted,114 this Author
recommends that Congress redraft, for a third time, legislation attempting
to protect minors. Perhaps Congress should use a national standard as
suggested by Justice O’Connor in Ashcroft v. ACLU.115 In the meantime,
alternative solutions,116 including user-based regulation,117 such as a rating
system118 and filtering,119 should be used.
While this Author is a staunch defender of First Amendment rights,
this Author also acknowledges the compelling governmental interest in
protecting minors from virtual child pornography and accessing
pornographic materials online. This Author advocates extending exceptions
to the First Amendment in these areas.
111. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
112. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
113. Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S. Ct. 1389, 1406 (2002).
114. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 122 S. Ct. 1700, 1702 (2002).
115. See supra notes 93-94 and accompanying text. See generally Scott Winstead, The
Application of the “Contemporary Community Standard” to Internet Pornography: Some
Thoughts and Suggestions, 3 LOY. INTELL. PROP. & HIGH TECH. J. 28 (Winter 2000).
116. See generally William D. Deane, Comment, COPA and Community Standards on
the Internet: Should the People of Maine and Mississippi Dictate the Obscenity Standard in
Las Vegas and New York?, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 245 (2001).
117. See generally Anthony Nilcoli, Least Restrictive Means: A Clear Path for User-
Based Regulation of Minors’ Access to Indecent Material on the Internet, 27 J. LEGIS. 225
(2001).
118. See generally Tim Specht, Untangling the World Wide Web: Restricting Children’s
Access to Adult Materials While Preserving the Freedoms of Adults, 21 N. ILL. U. L. REV.
411 (2001).
119. See generally Sahara Stone, Child Online Protection Act: The Problem of
Contemporary Community Standards on the World Wide Web, 9 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1
(2001).
